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Abstract 
The theory of embodied cognition can provide HCI practitioners and theorists 
with  new  ideas  about  interaction  and  new  principles  for  better  designs. 
I support this claim with four ideas about cognition: (1) interacting with tools 
changes the way we think and perceive – tools, when manipulated, are soon 
absorbed  into  the body  schema,  and  this  absorption  leads  to  fundamental 
changes in the way we perceive and conceive of our  environments;  (2)  we 
think  with  our  bodies  not  just  with  our  brains;  (3)  we  know  more  by  do-
ing than 3by seeing – there are times when physically performing an activity 
is better than watching someone else perform the activity, even though our 
motor resonance system fires strongly during other person observa tion; (4) 
there are times when we literally think with things. These four ideas have 
major  implications  for  interaction design, especially the design of tangible, 
physical, context aware, and telepresence systems. 
Categories  and  Subject  Descriptors:  H.1.2  (User/Machine  Systems);  H.5.2 
(User Interfaces): Interaction styles (e.g., commands, menus, forms, direct ma-
nipulation). 
General Terms: Human Factors, Theory. 
Additional Key Words and Phrases: human-computer interaction; embodied 
cognition; distributed cognition; situated cognition; interaction design; tangi-
ble interfaces; physical computation;, mental simulation. 
 
 
 
                                                             
17 The first version of the article was published in ACM Transactions on Computer Human Interac-
tion, Vol. 20, Issue 1, March 2013, Article No. 3. The article is re-published with a kind permission 
of Holder of the copyright. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of embodied cognition offers us new ways to think about bodies, 
mind, and technology. Designing interactivity will never be the same.  
The  embodied  conception  of  a tool provides a  first  clue  of  things to  come. 
When a person hefts a tool the neural representation of their body schema 
changes as  they recalibrate their body perimeter to absorb the end-point of 
the  tool (La ` davas  2002). As  mastery  develops,  the  tool  reshapes  their  per-
ception, altering how they see and act, revising their concepts, and changing 
how  they  think  about  things.  This  echoes Marshall  McLuhan’s  famous  line 
“we  shape  our  tools  and  thereafter  our  tools  shape  us”  (McLuhan  1964). 
A stick changes a blind person’s contact and grasp of the world; a violin chang-
es a musician’s sonic reach; roller-skates change physical speed, altering the 
experience of danger, stride, and distance. These tools change the way we en-
counter,  engage,  and  interact  with  the  world.  They  change  our  minds.  As 
technology digitally enhances tools we will absorb their new powers. Is there a 
limit to how far our powers can be increased? What are the guidelines on how 
to effectively alter minds? 
Consider a moment longer how coming tools will change us. On the “perception” 
side, our senses will reveal hidden patterns, microscopic, telescopic, and be-
yond our electromagnetic range, all visualized imaginatively. On the “action” 
side, our augmented control will be fine enough to manipulate with microme-
ter precision scalpels too small for our genetic hands; we will drive with milli-
second  sensitivity  vehicles  big  enough  to  span  a  football  field  or  small 
enough to enter an artery. Our future is prosthetic: a world of nuanced feed-
back and control through enhanced interaction. These are the obvious things. 
Less obvious, though, is how new tools will redefine our lived-in world: how we 
will conceptualize how and what we do. New tools make new tasks and activi-
ties possible. This makes predicting the future almost out of reach. Designers 
need to understand the dynamic between invention, conception, and cognition. 
It is complicated. And changing. Good design needs good science fiction; and 
good science fiction needs good cognitive science. 
Consider next the role the body itself plays in cognition. This is the second clue 
to our  imminent  future.  The  new  theory  of  mind  emerging  over  the  last 
twenty years holds that  the  physical  elements  of  our  body  figure  in  our 
thought.  Unimpaired  humans think with their body in ways that are impos-
sible for the paralyzed. If true, this means that thought is not confined to the 
brain;  it  stretches  out,  distributed  over  body  and  cortex,  suggesting  that 
body parts, because of the tight way we are coupled to them, may behave 
like cognitive components, partially shaping how we think. 
Before the theories of embodied, situated, and distributed cognition “think-
ing” was assumed to happen exclusively in the head. Voice and gesture were Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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ways of externalizing thought but not  part of creating  it.  Thought occurred 
inside; it was only expressed on the outside. This sidelined everything outside 
the brain. Thus, utterance, gesture, and bodily action  were  not  seen as  ele-
ments of thinking; they were the expression of  thought,  proof  that  thinking 
was already taking place on the inside. Not really necessary. 
On newer accounts, thinking is a process that is distributed and interactive. 
Body movement can literally be part of thinking. In any process, if you change 
one of the key components in a functionally significant way you change the 
possible trajectories of the system. Apply this to thought and it means that 
a significant change in body or voice might affect how we think. Perhaps if 
we speak faster we make ourselves think faster. Change our body enough and 
maybe we can even think what is currently unthinkable. For instance, a new 
cognitive  prosthesis  might  enable  us  to  conceptualize  things  that  before 
were completely out of reach. And not just the 10
20  digit of pi! It would be 
a new way of thinking of pi; something unlike anything we can understand 
now, in principle. If modern cognitive theories are right, bodies have greater 
cognitive consequences than we used to believe. 
This idea can be generalized beyond bodies to the objects we interact with. If 
a tool can at times be absorbed into the body then why limit the cognitive to 
the boundaries of the skin? Why not admit that humans, and perhaps some 
higher animals too, may actually  think with objects  that are  separate from 
their  bodies,  assuming  the  two, creature and object, are coupled appropri-
ately? If tools can be thought with, why not admit an even stronger version of 
the hypothesis: that if an object is cognitively gripped in the right way then it 
can be incorporated into our thinking process even if it is not neurally ab-
sorbed? Handling an object, for example, may be part of a thinking process, if 
we  move  it  around  in  a  way  that  lets  us  appreciate  an  idea  from  a  new 
point  of view.  Model-based  reasoning,  literally.  Moving  the  object  and  at-
tending to what that movement reveals pushes us to a new mental state that 
might be hard to reach without outside help. 
If it is true that we can and do literally think with physical objects, even if 
only for brief moments, then new possibilities open up for the design of tan-
gible, reality-based, and natural computing. Every object we couple with in 
a cognitive way becomes an opportunity for thought, control, and imagina-
tion. These cognitively gripped objects are not simply thought aids like cal-
culators; things that speed up what, in principle, we can do otherwise. They 
let  us do  things  we cannot  do  without  them,  or  at  least not without huge 
effort. The implications of a theory of thinking that allows lifeless material 
things to be actual constituents of the thinking process are far reaching. They 
point to a future where one day, because of digital enhancement and good 
design,  it will be mundane to  think  what  is  today  unconceivable. Without 
cognitively informed designers we will never get there. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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1.1. Overview and Organization 
This article has six sections. In the next section, Section 2, I review some of 
the literature on tool absorption (Maravita and Iriki 2004), and tie this to 
a discussion  of the theory  of enactive  perception  (O’Regan and  Noe ¨  2001; 
Noe ¨ 2005), to explain why tool absorption changes the way we perceive the 
world.  The  short  answer  is that  in addition to altering our sense of where 
our body ends each tool reshapes our “enactive landscape”—the  world  we 
see and partly create as active agents. With a tool in our hands we selective-
ly see what is tool relevant; we see tool-dependent affordances; we extend our 
exploratory and probative capacities. This is obvious for a blind man with a 
cane, who alters his body’s length and gains tactile knowledge of an otherwise 
invisible world three feet away. His new detailed knowledge of the nearby 
changes his sense of the terrain, and of the shape of things too big to handle 
but small enough to sweep. He revises  his  perceptual  apprehension  of  the 
peripersonal
18 both because he can sweep faster than he can touch and be-
cause he has extended his peripersonal field (Iriki et al. 1996; Ladavas 1998). 
It is less obvious, though no less true, that a cook who is clever with a blade, 
or knows how to wield a spatula, sees the cooking world differently than a 
neophyte. Skill with a knife informs how to look at a chicken prior to its 
dismemberment; it informs how one looks at an unpeeled orange or a cauli-
flower, attending to this or that feature, seeing possibilities that are invisible 
to  more  na¨ ıve  chefs  or  diners.  The  same  holds  for  spatulas.  Without  ac-
quaintance with a spatula one would be blind to the affordances of food that 
make them cleanly liftable off of surfaces, or the role and meaning of the 
way oil coats a surface. With expertise comes expert perception (Goodwin 
1994; Aglioti et al. 2008). This is a core commitment of embodiment theory: the 
concepts and beliefs we have about the world are grounded in our perceptual-
action experience with things, and the more we have tool-mediated experi-
ences the more our understanding of the world is  situated  in the way  we 
interact through tools. 
In Section 3, the longest part of the article, I present some remarkable findings 
that arose in our study of superexpert dancers. 
One might think that we already know what our bodies are good for. To some 
extent, we do. For instance, the by now classic position of embodied cognition 
is that the more actions you can perform the more affordances you register (e.g., 
if you can juggle you can see an object as affording juggling) (Gibson 1966). Our 
bodies  also  infiltrate  cognition  because  our  early  sensory  experience  of 
things, our particular history of interactions with them, figures in how we 
                                                             
18 Peripersonal space is the three-dimensional volume within arm’s reach and leg’s reach. Visual 
stimuli near a hand are coded by neurons with respect to the hand, not the eyes or some other 
location reflecting egocentric location (Makin et al. 2007). Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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understand  them  ever  after.  Meaning  is  modal-sensory  specific  (Barsalou 
2008). If we acquired knowledge of a thing visually, or we tend to identify 
that thing on visual grounds, we stimulate these historic neural connections in 
the later visual cortex when thinking of it (Barsalou 1999). These visual experi-
ences often activate motor representations too, owing to our history of motor 
involvement with  the  things  we  see.  Thus,  when  thinking  or  speaking  we 
regain  access  to  the constellation of associations typical of interacting with 
the thing. Even just listening to language can trigger these activations in the 
associative cortex. The sentence “the alarm sounded and John jumped out of 
bed” will activate areas in the auditory and motor cortex related to alarms 
and jumping out of bed (Kaschak et al. 2006; Winter and Bergen 2012). This is 
the received embodiment  view. 
In  the  findings  reported  here  I  discuss  additional  ways  bodies  can  play  a 
role  in cognitive processing, ways we can use the physical machinery of the 
body and not just our sensory cortex and its associative network. This means 
that our bodies are good for more  things  than  have  traditionally  been  as-
sumed.  More  specifically,  I  discuss  howe we use our bodies as simulation 
devices to physically model things. 
For example, we found in our study with dancers that they are able to learn 
and  consolidate  mastery  of  a  reasonably  complex  dance  phrase  better  by 
physically practicing a distorted model of the phrase than by mentally simu-
lating  the  phrase  undistorted.  If  all  that  matters  is  what  happens  in  the 
brain we would not observe this difference in learning between simulating 
in  the  head  and  simulating  with  the  body.  But  somehow,  by  modeling  a 
movement  idea  bodily,  even  when  the  model  is  imperfect,  the  dancers  we 
studied were able to learn more about the structure of their dance move-
ment  than  by  simulating  it  without  moving.  Perhaps  this  intuitive.  But 
more  surprisingly,  the dancers learned the phrase better by working with 
the distorted model than by practicing the way one intuitively thinks they 
should: by physically executing the phrase, or parts of it, in a complete and 
undistorted  manner,  repeatedly.  In  other  words,  our dancers learned best 
when  they  explored  a  dance  phrase  by  making  a  physical  model  of  the 
phrase (through dancing it), even though the model they made was imper-
fect. Standard practice might not be considered to be modeling. No one pre-
dicted that finding! The dancers seem to be using their bodies in a special way 
when they make these imperfect models. 
This is not specific to dance. Mechanics trying to understand a machine may 
sketch on  paper  an  imprecise  or  distorted  model.  This  can  help  them  ex-
plore  mechanical  subsystems  or  help  them  consider  physical  principles. 
Architects may sketch in fluid strokes their early ideas to get a feel for the 
way light pours in, or how people might move through a space. Accuracy is 
not important, flow is. Violinists when practicing a hard passage may work AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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on their bowing while largely neglecting their fingers. They are not aiming 
for  perfection  in  the  whole  performance;  they  are  fixating  on  aspects. To 
fixate on certain aspects it may be easier to work with their body and in-
strument than  to  think  about  those  aspects  “offline”  in  their  head.  These 
sorts of methods may be common and intuitive; but on reflection, it is odd, 
to say the least, that practicing (literally) the wrong thing can lead to better 
performance of the right thing (Kirsh et al. 2012). I think  this technique is 
prevalent, and deeply revealing. 
Does  anyone  understand  how  or  why  it  works?  The  knee-jerk  reply  is 
that  for sketches,  at  least,  the  function  of  the  activity  is  to  take  some-
thing  that  is  transitory and internal—a thought or idea—and convert it into 
something that is persistent and external—a sketch. This allows the agent to 
come  back  to  it  repeatedly,  and  to interact with it in different ways than 
something purely in mind (Buxton 2007). But persistence doesn’t explain the 
utility of making physical actions like gesturing, violin bowing, or dancing, all 
of which are external but ephemeral. How do we think with these ephem-
era? 
Section  4  explores  why  such  ephemera might  be  so  effective. The answer 
I  offer is that body activity may figure as an external mediating structure 
in  thinking and practicing. The dance practice we observed, called “marking” 
in the dance world, seems to work well because the dancers model just the 
aspects of a movement they want to think about. This is better than mental 
simulation  alone  because  making  the  body move  through  step  one may 
prime step two more forcefully than  just running  through step one in the 
mind’s eye. Motor cortex primes motor cortex. Predictably, we also found that 
practicing the correct movement is a better way to practice than lying down 
and running through a movement idea mentally. But if getting the body to 
move for the sake of motor and procedural priming were all that is special 
about  physical  practice  then  why  would  practicing  distorted  movements 
yield better learning than practicing the correct movement? 
To  explain  why  working  with  an  imperfect  model  might  be  better  than 
working with  the  real  thing,  I  explore  how  the  body,  or  physical  models 
more generally, can help people project the structure or idea they are most 
interested in. When a dancer marks a movement with her body she creates a 
cognitive support for herself that helps her to: (a) manage what she will at-
tend to at each moment, (b) focus her  thought on the relevant features or 
aspects of the movement idea, and (c) compute outcomes and trajectories, 
ultimately in ways that may be better than through mental simulation, or 
better  even  than  through  correct  physical  practice  (and  hence  kinesthetic 
perception too). Sometimes working with a simpler thing, even if it is im-
perfect, is better than working with a perfect thing. Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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The  comparative  advantage  of  using  imperfect  models  is  variable.  Some-
times it is best to work directly with real things; to dance the real phrase if you 
can, to practice the whole musical passage, or to work with real engines. This 
is  probably  true  for  simple dance  phrases,  simple  musical  passages,  and 
simple  physical  objects.  Whether  it  is more effective to work with the real 
thing or a model depends, of course, on what you are trying to accomplish. 
Sometimes  it  is  easier  to  manipulate  models  than  to  manipulate  the  real 
thing. The  real thing may  be cumbersome,  heavy,  or  slow and  difficult to 
handle. Sometimes it is better to gesture, sketch, or work with a simplified 
model. For certain tasks, working with a model has a better cost structure, 
both  physically and  cognitively.  Similarly,  dancing  a  real  phrase  may  re-
quire coping with too many complexities at once. An imperfect model may be 
more flexible, simple, and adaptable than the real thing. 
The same benefits, however, may hold for mental images, which is why some-
times it is so useful to work things through in one’s head rather than working 
directly with real things. Mental images, just as gestures and simplified move-
ments, are fast and flexible. So predictably, sometimes they are the most con-
venient thing to think with, better than embodied models (that is, gestures and 
overt movements) and better than working with the real thing. But working 
with a mental image also has limitations. When an object has a complicated 
spatial structure, or is highly detailed, it is often easier to simulate outcomes 
by manipulating either the real physical thing, or an appropriately simplified 
physical  model  of  the  thing  than  to  simulate  manipulating  that  thing 
through mental imagery (Kirsh and Maglio 1995; Wexler et al. 1998). It all 
depends  on  the  internal and  external  cost  structure  of  the  manipulation, 
what is often called the mental and physical costs. The scientific challenge is 
to determine the right dimensions to measure cost (Kirsh 2010). If we can dis-
cover these dimensions, we may be able to predict when working with a basic 
model is best; that some-times simplified physical models, even biased ones, 
are better things to think with and practice with than either working with 
“real” things or working with internal imagery. 
The upshot is that, given our case study, it seems that imperfect models can, at 
times, help  us  outperform  ourselves.  Despite  our  not  yet  knowing  exactly 
when imperfect models help us outclass, my own belief is that we use our bod-
ies (and hands) far more often for modeling than previously appreciated. This 
has implications for design. If it is true that imperfect modeling can, at times, 
facilitate thinking and learning better than imagination or better than work-
ing with the real object of knowledge, the question arises as to why we must 
be the modeling agent. Why not watch someone else be the external simula-
tor  or  watch  a  computer-created  simulation?  Maybe  it  is  possible  to make 
our  thinking  process  run  faster,  or  cheaper,  or  deeper  if  we  piggyback  on 
the actions of others or on the actions of computers. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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In Section 5, I present additional results from video analysis of choreograph-
ic creation to show that using one’s own body to explore a dance movement is a 
better way to  understand a  dance  movement  than  watching  someone  else 
explore it. This may seem obvious, but the point needs to be made because 
there has been so much discussion in the neuroscience literature on the pow-
er of the motor resonance system (Rizzolati and Sinigaglia 2007; Agnew et al. 
2007; Aglioti et al. 2008). 
There is  extensive neurophysiological  evidence of a  close link between ac-
tion observation and action execution. For reviews, see Viviani (2002), Bucci-
no et al. (2004), Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004), Wilson and Knoblich (2005). It 
has been convincingly argued that we reenact or mimic an actor’s movements 
by covertly behaving as if we are the actor rather than the observer (Sebanz 
and Shiffrar 2007). These covert actions can be subliminal. The motor system 
can be activated by “imagining actions, recognizing tools, learning by observa-
tion, or even understanding the behavior of other people” (Jeannerod  1994, 
2001), as well by the processes of motor preparation that underpin “(intend-
ed) actions that will eventually be executed” (Jeannerod 2001). So a covert ac-
tion is the internal counterpart that may or may not be hooked up to an overt 
action. As Jeannerod, the originator of the idea, said “Every overtly executed 
action implies the existence of a covert stage, whereas a covert action does 
not necessarily turn out into an overt action” (Jeannerod 2001). The surprising 
thing is that processes in this covert system may be so strong that that even 
just  watching  an  action  may  be  as  powerful a learning experience as per-
forming an action oneself (Cross et al. 2009). This means that we might be 
able to watch someone else gesture or dance or manipulate gears or sketch a 
structure and our thinking is driven forward just as effectively as if we were 
the one overtly gesturing, or dancing, etc. Although the comparison is rarely 
made, an analogy to listening to someone speak may be apt. When attending 
to someone talk, if listener and speaker are in tune with them, they seem to 
synchronize  their thinking. To make sense of their speech, their inferences 
must  largely  march  in  step.  Might  this  cognitive  resonance also apply by 
watching others perform action or by watching them manipulate objects? 
This ties in with a further thesis of embodied cognition: to fully make sense of 
what we  are seeing we need to run our motor system simultaneously with 
watching to get a sense of what it would be like if we were to perform the 
action ourselves. Our sympathetic body  involvement  grounds  the  meaning 
of  action  in  a  personal  way.  It  activates  an ideomotor representation that 
gives us first-person knowledge of another’s action (Shin et al. 2010). Because 
we see things as if we are the agent we understand the point of the action, 
the details to be attended to, and the reason it unfolds as it does (Knoblich 
and Flach 2001). When we experience another’s action as if we were  that 
person, we can  appreciate  why  it  makes  sense  to  do  things  that  way.  We 
covertly compute the subgoal structure of the action. (Prinz 1997). Evaluat-Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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ing the scope and limits of this central claim is important in building a bal-
anced view of embodied cognition. 
I address this question briefly, again using data from our dance study, by dis-
cussing the extra knowledge the choreographer of the piece acquired by exe-
cuting movement rather than just watching it. I speculate that the key extra he 
received from overt bodily involvement over and beyond what he would get 
by  simulating  an  action  covertly  is  knowledge  of  kinesthetic  things  that 
have no visual counterpart: for instance, pain, resistance, gravitational pull. 
What  is  true  for  choreographic  creativity  likely  applies  to  other  types  of 
creativity.  I  believe  the  cognitive  importance  of  overt  action  generalizes 
beyond  dance  and  is important  for  designers  to  understand.  For  as  we 
look  for  new  and  better  ways  to extend cognition, we need to know when 
and how effectively we can piggyback off the efforts of others—how and when 
we learn by watching—rather than having to be the acting agent who learns 
by overt doing. 
In Section 6, I briefly unify the theory of tools and bodily thinking into an 
account of how objects, and not just body parts, can be brought into the think-
ing process. This too  is  important  for  designers,  since  it  offers  a  possible 
foundation for the power of tangible and physical interfaces. I conclude the 
article with a brief coda reviewing the main ideas and some of their further 
implications for interaction design. 
 
2. TOOLS CHANGE OUR BODY, OUR PERCEPTION, OUR CONCEPTION 
2.1. The Space Around Us 
Studies based on human lesion, monkey neurophysiology, and human imag-
ing,  such  as  fMRI  and  TMS  (Transcranial  Magnetic  Stimulation),  provide 
evidence  that  when suitably  embodied,  human  and  mammal  brains  con-
struct  multiple  representations  of  space (Colby 1998;  Graziano and  Gross 
1995). Certain brain cells fire specifically when  objects  approach  the  space 
around the body, such as when we see an insect fly toward our face, or when 
our hands are about to be touched. This near-body region is called periper-
sonal space. It can be understood informally as the space surrounding an 
agent that is within easy reach (Ladavas et al. 1998; Brain 1941). In addition to 
peripersonal representations there are neural representations for personal 
and extrapersonal space. Personal space refers to the space occupied by the 
body  itself  (Vaishnavi  et  al.  1999;  Coslett  1998;  Bisiach  et  al.  1986).  Ex-
trapersonal space refers to space beyond the reach of our limbs (Previc 1998; 
Brain 1941). 
 AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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2.2. Tools Change Our Body Schema 
Tools bear a special relation to peripersonal space since we code the distances 
of nearby things in manipulation-relative and touch-relative ways (Maravita 
et al. 2002). That is, we code what is nearby—more precisely, what is “within 
reach”—in terms of how far we have to move our arms and hands to manip-
ulate or touch things. When we use a tool to reach for a distant object it is as 
if we are extending our motor capability and we treat our hand as if  it is 
elongated to the tip of the tool. Tool use transiently modifies action  space 
representation by revising what is now within reach. No surprise, then, that 
humans can quickly adapt their spatial representation to functionally mean-
ingful things such as within fly-swatter distance, tennis reach distance, fenc-
ing  distance  and even  pole-vaultable  height.  As Maravita  and  Iriki  (2004) 
put  it,  “neurophysiological, psychological  and  neuropsychological  research 
suggests that this extended motor capability is followed by changes in specific 
neural networks that hold an updated map of body shape and posture (the pu-
tative ‘Body Schema’).” Apparently, we change our body schema to include a 
tool’s  dimensions  (or  at  least  its  end-point).  We  absorb  the  tool into our 
functioning body
19. The original work by Iriki et al. (1996) showed that when 
Japanese macaques were given a rake and three weeks of training in using 
the rake to pull in food pellets just beyond their reach, the specific neurons 
representing the hand and arm, as well as the space around these body parts, 
changed their firing pattern to include the rake and the space around it. In 
interview Iriki described it this way: 
In  the  parietal  association  area,  there  are  neurons  that  compare  so-
matic sensation with visual information and become activated upon rec-
ognizing the body. In untrained monkeys, these neurons  do not become 
activated because  the  rake  is  nothing  more  than  a  foreign  implement. 
After  they become able to use the rake as a tool as a result of training, 
however,  the neurons  become  active  as  if  the  rake  is  recognized  as  an 
extension of the hand (Iriki 2009). 
 
2.3. Extending the Body and Redefining the Peripersonal 
The tools we have discussed reshape our peripersonal space by extending it a 
few feet. Can  tools  let  us  extend  it  to  terrains  that  are  geographically  re-
mote? This is a useful question for interaction designers. For designers work 
with a sense of where the body ends and the environment begins. If certain 
tools can be absorbed, this body boundary becomes an element to be negotiat-
ed in design. 
                                                             
19  A further question worth asking is whether our somatic representation of the rigidity and 
strength of our “extended” limbs is altered when we hold a rigid tool or strap on large skis. Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
 
134 
 
There  is  ample  anecdotal  reportage  that  our  sense  of  where  our  body 
boundaries are, and what in space we can affect can be altered through tele-
presence  and  teleimmersion.  With  digital  help  we  can  act  on  objects  arbi-
trarily distant and then perceptually sense what we are doing. For example, 
there are tele-presence systems that enable an operator to manage a submers-
ible on the ocean floor, a land vehicle in a war zone, and a scalpel in another 
town’s operating theater, while all the while ensconced in a cozy room some 
miles away. Given the right sensori-motor hookup the remote human feels as 
if she is in contact with a robust “enactive landscape” to think, speak, and 
interact with, as if there. One might think, before studying, that the key suc-
cess condition  is for  the tele-agent  to have  worked  in the  relevant  enactive 
landscape up close first, using his or her unaided hands and eyes. You need to 
have worked with a scalpel in your actual hand before mastering it in your 
digital  hand.  But  this  is  not really necessary. Pilots of submersibles can be 
trained on remote enactive landscapes from the start as long as action and 
feedback are close enough in time. It seems that what falls into your periper-
sonal space, at one or another moment, can be negotiated early on through 
practice with tools. 
This raises the next question. How different can our remote “body parts” be 
from  our own  before  we  cannot  assimilate  them?  Snap-on  arms  and  legs 
are one thing. But how about  two sets of nine-fingered  claws  that  operate 
in articulate and continuous ways? Controlling these by means of a piano-
like multifingered  input  device might  work for claws  with  ten  or  less  fin-
gers.  But  what  about  twelve-fingered  claws,  and  what  about having  the 
fingers work in continuous fashion? Probably not impossible; but clearly an 
interface challenge. And then there is the question of how different a scene 
in  a  virtual world  can  be  before  it  shatters  our  situated  grasp  of  things? 
Can we cope with a world that runs at clock speeds fifty times our own? 
A  rudimentary  start  on  experimentally  determining  the  constraints  on 
embodied extensions was made by Ikiri et al. (1998) when testing to see if a 
monkey’s sense of hand size changes by replacing the normal image of its 
hand with an enlarged one. As reported by Blakelee (2004): 
Dr. Iriki allowed the monkeys to see a virtual hand on a video monitor 
while the monkey’s real hand, hidden from view, operated a joystick. When 
he made the image of the hand larger, the monkey’s brain treated the vir-
tual hand as if it were an enlarged version of its own; the brain’s hand area 
blew up like a cartoon character’s hand.” Evidently, anatomical mappings 
can be remapped. 
How far can these remapping transformations go? An enlarged hand seems 
innocent when compared with some of the mutant alterations we can imag-
ine. Is a person like Edward Scissorhands possible? Are there limits on what 
can be a prosthetic “body part”? And can these bizarre body parts, especially AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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the ones that involve distant interaction, be incorporated into our periper-
sonal space as long as we tightly control them? These are open questions for 
the embodiment program. They address the core HCI question: what makes a 
tool, prosthetic, or digital helper work and feel natural? What are the limits 
to neuroadaptation driven by immersion? 
 
2.4. Tools also Change Our Perception 
Perception is altered by our skill in using tools. This is the next implication of 
extending the embodiment paradigm to include tools. Hills look steeper than 
normal to subjects wearing a heavy backpack (Proffitt 2006). When a tool is ab-
sorbed into our body schema, our perception of height, distance, and related 
magnitudes  changes.  The  added  effort  of  carrying  around  weight  affects 
perception. That is just a start. The space in front of a car is affected by the 
maneuverability, power, and speed of the car. Gibson called this “a  sort of 
tongue protruding forward along the road” (Gibson and Crooks 1938). It is 
something like the safe operating envelope, the stable handling region, “the 
field  of  possible  paths  which  the  car  may  take  unimpeded”  (Gibson  and 
Crooks 1938). By parity of reasoning we would predict that warehouse staff 
wearing roller-skates will judge the length of inventory shelves to be shorter, 
as they speed down aisles looking at the way things can be picked up. Down-
hill skiers will view the traversability of the terrain differently when wearing 
skis than  when wearing boots, and  surfers will view waves differently de-
pending on whether they are on a short or a long board. In all these cases, 
equipment affects how things are seen because how we act on the world, and 
the tasks we perform, shape how we perceive. 
In the Gibsonion approach to perception (Gibson 1966) the world to be per-
ceived is defined relative to the action repertoire of a perceiver A{a1, a2,... 
an}. Change the repertoire and you change the mode of interaction by which 
the perceptual world is partly constituted. With a tool, the action repertoire is 
increased to include tool-enabled actions, so there ought to be new affordanc-
es to perceive. Remarkably, Gibson wrote next to nothing on the effect of tools 
on perception or the relation between tool and affordance.
20 This points to a 
tension in the classical Gibsonian position. Holding a hammer or carrying a 
lit cigarette is not a function of untutored human bodies. These behaviors are 
not in our native action repertoire, our culture free repertoire. But they are 
natural in an artifactual world, the real world we inhabit. They have conse-
quences Gibson  would  have  appreciated.  For  instance,  as  most  of  us  have 
unfortunately observed, a person who smokes cigarettes will see most physi-
                                                             
20 See Jones (2003) where the word “tool” does not appear in his discussion of Gibson’s evolving con-
ception of affordance over his lifetime. Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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cal environments as filled with  things  and  areas  that  afford  catching  ash, 
things  that  can  serve  as  ashtrays. Nonsmokers are blind to them. A stone-
mason will look at bricks for places to apply cement; when looking at an odd 
brick he will “see” the particular trowel shape that is needed. A competent tool 
user may perceive the affordances brought into existence by her use of tools, 
even when those tools are not in her hands! 
Skill is a factor too. A person’s skill in using a tool partly determines the condi-
tions in which it can be used successfully. An expert carpenter can use a chis-
el effectively in more situations than a novice. Accordingly, skill affects what 
an  agent  will see  in a  given  situation;  skilled  tool  users  detect  more  tool-
relevant features, tool-related affordances, than lesser-skilled users. 
 
2.5. Goals Make Perception Enactive 
Goals also figure in perception. This view moves us beyond Gibsonian exege-
sis to a more enactive paradigm (Varela et al. 1991). The enactive account of per-
ception (Myin and  O’Regan  2008;  Noe ¨ 2005)  starts  from  the  Gibsonian  in-
sight  that  perception  is active and based on the possibilities of interaction, 
but it then adds three more things: interests, attention, and phenomenology. 
These lead to a conception of an environment that is both more and less than 
Gibson assumed. 
When something grabs our attention we often fail to notice things that are 
visually obvious. This is called attention blindness (Simons 2000). In a famous 
example, subjects failed to notice a person in a gorilla suit a few feet in front of 
them  because  they  were  concentrating  on  whether  a  basketball  was  being 
passed legally. They were so focused on the ball they ignored the hairy legs and 
hands, and the mask. 
We also overlook elements in full view when we are distracted by a major 
change, especially if the “in your face” change occurs simultaneously with the 
other changes. This is called change blindness (Rensink 2002). Jointly, the effect 
of this dual blindness is that the world we experience is a tiny fraction of what 
is there to be perceived. Like a  hyperbolic  visualization,  we  exaggerate  the 
parts we are interested in and remain unaware of parts that hold no interest. 
Because the tools we carry are usually related to our goals and activities, in-
directly they shape attention and interest. They narrow and expand our view 
hyperbolically. 
At the  same time, though,  when  we  see  something,  we  don’t  just  see  what 
our eyes have taken in; we factor in predictions about what we expect to take 
in if we continue to look around. Phenomenologically, we experience more of 
the world than there often is. For instance, when people look at Andy War-
hol’s  Wall  of  Marilyns  they  do  not  saccade to  every  print  of  Marilyn  (Noe ¨ AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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2005). They look at a few, perhaps examine some quite closely,  and  periph-
erally  register  the  rest.  Yet  their  experience  is  of  a  complete  wall of Mari-
lyns. Somehow their current perceptual experience includes the counterfac-
tual beliefs of what they would see were they to look at each and every print 
closely.
21 
 
2.6. Enactive Landscape 
Let  us  introduce  the  idea  of  an  enactive  landscape  as  the  structure  that 
an  agent cocreates with the world when he or she acts in a goal-oriented 
manner.  An  enactive  landscape  is  meant  to  capture  the  goalor  activity-
dependent nature of the perceptual world. It is the merger of a few ideas: task 
environment – the states and actions that are  related  to  the  achieving  the 
goals and interests of the agent, the broader set of outside things or proper-
ties that can be acted on by that agent, and the full range of properties that 
agent can discriminate. The idea of an enactive landscape is a useful concept 
for designers to bear in mind when inventing new tools or systems because 
when a person has a tool in his hands his reshape their enactive landscape: 
they perceive more things and properties when working with a tool than they 
would  when  working  unaided.  In  a  sense, designers  create  enactive  land-
scapes by designing tools. 
Take the case of musical instruments. Apart from voice or clapping, music comes 
into being because musicians use musical instruments. No music makers and 
no  musical  instruments  then  no  music.
22  Musical  instruments  provide  the 
basic physical landscape a  musician  encounters.  But  the  more  skillful  the 
musician,  the  larger  the  enactive landscape they inhabit, because skills com-
bine with instruments to constitute a bigger world of possibilities. Music, con-
ceptualized as this bigger world of instrument created possibilities, is an ex-
                                                             
21 This approach is worth putting in computational terms. To capture the idea that our counterfac-
tual expectations are already factored into our experience we can represent perceptual experi-
ence as the current state of a predictive system, a broad-branched Markhov system of some sort, 
or a predictive state representation. Each branch, each path, represents an action that might be 
taken: a saccade to the far image, a step to the right and glance forward, and so on. Attached to 
each action is a probability of what one would likely see or feel. The predictive system should be 
further constrained by adding biases on the probability of actions that are a function of the goals 
and interests of the agent. Thus, an art historian, because of his interests, might be more likely to 
approach etchings closely to examine the printing technique than a casual observer. Or, return-
ing to a cigarette smoker, because her cigarette-related interests are strongly activated when in 
the act of smoking, she is even more likely to look around for ashtray-like things. This constructed 
counterfactual space, with a probability distribution over outcomes that factors in the likelihood 
of a particular person acting in a certain way, is what defines the current state of a perceiver and 
what determines her experience. 
22 We ignore the Platonist claim that music is part of an ideal realm on par with numbers and 
other mathematical objects independent of construction. Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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treme instance of an enactive landscape. To a musician it is the set of possibili-
ties that because of their instrument they can bring into being. An enactive 
landscape,  then,  is  the  set  of  possibilities  that  can  in  principle  be  brought 
into  being when  an  agent  interacts  with  an  underlying  environment  while 
engaged in a task or pursuing a goal. 
To  complete  this  picture  we  need  to  remember  that  much  of  our  environ-
ment  is  defined  by  rules  and  cultural  constraints.  Chess,  sports  and  other 
games depend more on their rules, then on physical things like boards, playing 
areas, pieces and equipment. Rules and cultural influences mean that the same 
physical kitchen can constitute many cooking landscapes. The enactive land-
scape of a cook emerges from the interplay of a cook’s interests and the cultural 
resources – such as recipes, food and taste preferences  –  with  the  physical 
things present – the ingredients, pots and pans, heat and layout of the kitch-
en. Each chef ’s vision is primed to notice the details of their physical space as it 
relates to their current recipe and their cooking style. (Almeida et al., 2008). 
In  fact,  looked  at  more  closely,  at  each  moment  what  a  chef  sees  is  partly 
primed by the tools in their hand. They see the things they might cut when 
they have a knife in their hands, the places to lay a dirty spatula when they 
are  holding  a  spatula  and  so  on. The same tunnel vision will apply during 
medical surgery. We are always primed to see the elements we expect to see as 
we  precede  in  a  task  or  an  activity.  (Endsley  1995).  This  means  that  the 
probability distribution that weights the possibilities present in an enactive 
landscape, will dynamically change as the agent shifts around the goal and sub-
goal structure of his or her task. 
Given, further, that we all multitask during most of our waking life, the actu-
al  environment  we  live  in,  must  be  a  superposition  of  dozens  of  enactive 
landscapes, each one with its own set of prediction generating elements and 
attention  drawing  features,  rising  and  falling  with  our  shifting  interests. 
(Kirsh  2005).  In  designing  a  workplace,  then,  skill  resides  in  blending  the 
many enactive landscapes of its probable inhabitants to minimize error, max-
imize effectiveness, reduce fatigue and delight aesthetic sensibilities. Under-
standing the role of tools in shaping these enactive landscapes is a first step. 
The second step is to understand how co-creation evolves. Embodied cogni-
tion offers us new conceptual tools to analyze agent environment interaction. 
 
2.7. Tools Change Our Conceptions 
The final way tools change how we engage the world is by reshaping our con-
ception of what is present and what is possible, not just our perception. An 
agent’s immersion in an enactive landscape inevitably leads to concept for-
mation. We are learning engines. Most  of the concepts  we  learn  are  highly 
situated and ad hoc (Barsalou 1983). They arise as meaningful elements in the AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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activity that cocreates an enactive landscape, but may not have obvious natu-
ral generalizations. For instance, the way we perceive a beer bottle as we strug-
gle to open it will typically give rise to the concept of trying-to-twista-cap-off. 
The phenomenon (the trying process) and the concept (the idea of what we are 
trying  to  do),  are  embedded  in  the  cap  opening  activity.  The  idea  of  cap-
twisting may eventually be generalized beyond beer bottles to other domains 
and tasks, losing its  ad  hoc  status.  But  it  started  out  highly  situated  in  the 
specifics  of  beer  bottles. When we use tools we multiply our ad hoc concepts 
because they multiply our enactive landscapes. 
Opening beer bottles is typical of everyday tasks. Every task has its ad hoc con-
cepts: washing our hands (ad hoc concept: the idiosyncratic way we each use 
hand soap), putting on socks (ad hoc concept: how we arrange each sock before 
slipping our foot in), sitting down (ad hoc concept: the way we stick our bottom 
out as we bend our knees). In each task there are task-specific things that rep-
resent points of learning or indicators of mastery. The hallmark of an ad hoc 
concept is that there is an attendable something, a potentially meaningful at-
tribute that can be identified, attended to, referred to at the time (at least in 
thought), that is revealed in the performance of the task. Not everyone will 
have the same ad hoc concepts, but in any task there are always many things 
we must attend to and which can become objects of thought. Some are the af-
fordances  in the  environment,  others  are  the  actions  we  perform,  or  the 
special way we perform them. 
What does this unending, and potentially idiosyncratic, production of ad hoc 
concepts mean to designers? It tells us that design is never finished and never 
truly universal. When agents have an ad hoc concept they are in a position to 
think explicitly about their situation reflectively. For instance, TV watchers of-
ten surf between channels. Channel surfing is an emergent behavior that, once 
recognized, can drive the desire for change. Without the concept it is unlikely 
that anyone would identify the standard hassles with  channel  surfing.  For 
instance, who  has not had the  irritation of switching  from  one channel be-
cause of a commercial, only to return to it after the program has restarted? 
This hassle, that is, the difficulty of timing when a commercial has finished – con-
stitutes a design opportunity. In some TV’s this need is met by a picture-in-
picture feature that permits watchers to monitor the last channel while surf-
ing, then toggling immediately back. The concept of channel surfing is typical 
of the cycle of how design gives rise to new and emergent behaviors that in 
turn  give  rise  to  new  designs.  It  highlights how  learning  in  our  built-up 
world  is  continuous  and  how  enactive  landscapes  are  both personal and 
evolving. This year’s cost structure incorrectly measures next year’s  interac-
tions as learning changes our behavior and cost benefit function (Kirsh 2010). 
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3. RETHINKING THE ROLE OUR BODY PLAYS IN COGNITION 
So far we have discussed how our tools and bodies are used to achieve prag-
matic goals. Bodies and tools can be used for nonpragmatic goals as well. Profes-
sional dancers, when practicing, use their bodies nonpragmatically for epis-
temic and “cognitive” purposes— specifically as a means to physically model 
things. The same may sometimes be true for gestures (Goldin-Meadow 2005; 
Goldin-Meadow Beilock 2010) and for many of the things we manipulate. We 
think with them. Manipulating a physical thing is, at times, a  method  for 
driving thought forward. In this part we provide empirical support for this 
claim and speculate on why it is true. 
 
3.1. An Experiment with Superexpert Dancers 
The data to be reported comes from a single experiment undertaken in 2010 to 
test the effectiveness of different ways of practicing a new dance phrase. It is 
part of a much more comprehensive cognitive ethnographic study exploring 
embodied and distributed cognition in dance creation. See Kirsh et al. (2009), 
Kirsh (2012a, 2012b), and Kirsh et al. (2012) for a description of that larger 
project. In this experiment we found that partially modeling a dance phrase 
by marking the phrase, as it is called in the dance world, is a better method 
of  practicing than  working  on  the  complete  phrase,  that  is, practicing  full-
out. We also found that both marking and full-out practice are better meth-
ods of practicing than repeated mental simulation, a process found effective 
in other activities. (see Kossylyn and Moulton 2009). This last result is intui-
tive: it is better to practice physically than solely in one’s head. But the first 
result,  that  partial modeling—a form of practicing a dance phrase aspect-by-
aspect—can  at  times  be  better  than  trying  to  duplicate  the  perfect  dance 
phraseS is a surprising result. Its explanation brings us closer to appreciating 
how physical activity—with body or tools—can help drive thought. Our results 
also suggest that prior work on learning by observation and learning by men-
tal practice may not scale up to complex movements. Externalizing thought 
processes improves or reshapes inner processes. 
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Fig. 1. (a) An Irish river dancer is caught in mid move; (b) the same move is marked 
using just the hands. River dancing is a type of step dancing where the arms are kept 
still. Typically, river dancers mark steps and positions using one hand for the move-
ment and the other for the floor. Most marking involves modeling phrases with  the 
whole body, and not just the hands. 
 
3.2. What Is Marking? 
As discussed briefly in the Introduction, marking refers to dancing a phrase 
in a less than complete manner. See Figure 1 for an example of hand marking, a 
form that is far smaller than the more typical method of marking that involves 
modeling a phrase with the whole body. Marking is part of the practice of dance, 
pervasive in all phases: whether creation, practice, rehearsal, or reflection. Vir-
tually all English-speaking dancers know the term, though few, if any, scholarly 
articles exist that describe the process or give instructions on how to do it.
23 
When dancers mark a phrase, they use their body’s movement and structural 
form as a support structure for imagining the real thing, or perhaps as a repre-
sentational vehicle pointing to the real thing or some aspect of it. The key fea-
ture is that they do not recreate the full dance phrase they normally perform; 
instead, they create a simplified or abstracted version—a model, a 3D sketch. 
The received wisdom is that dancers mark to save energy, to avoid strenuous 
movement  such  as  jumps,  and  to  practice  without  exhausting  themselves 
emotionally. But when  they  mark  they  often  report  that  they  are  working 
in  a  special  way,  such  as reviewing or exploring specific aspects of a phrase, 
its tempo, movement sequence, or underlying intention, and that by marking 
they can do this review without the mental complexity involved in creating the 
phrase “full-out.”
24 
                                                             
23 Search by professional librarians of dance in the U.K. and U.S. has yet to turn up scholarly arti-
cles on the practice of marking. 
24  These  reports  were  gathered  by  the  author  during  interviews  with  dancers  in  the  Random 
Dance company, as part of this study on marking. Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
 
142 
 
Marking, or the practice of creating a simplified version of a process—a per-
sonal model to work and think with—is found in countless activities beyond 
dance. Adults who play tennis, golf, or basketball can be seen running through 
a “practice” swing or shot for themselves, as if to prepare themselves for the real 
thing. Sometimes they even do this without a racket, club or ball. Cellists will 
sometimes practice passages on their arm, running through finger positions on 
their “right forearm held upright in front of the chest, as a substitute for the 
neck of the cello” (Potter 1980, page 109) in a manner reminiscent of an Irish 
river dancer hand marking a jig. No sound emerges. Theatrical performers, too, 
can often be seen muttering their lines, or executing “practice” moves before 
stepping  out  on  stage.  It  is a  standard  activity  in  theater  to do  an “Italian 
runthrough”—a slang phrase for saying one’s lines and moving about the stage 
extra fast when staging a play to clarify the timing and relative positions of the 
actors. All these cases are related to marking. The common element through-
out is that people seem to prefer working with a simplified version of a proce-
dure to practicing the full-out version. In a slightly different way, playing tennis 
or ping-pong on the Wii is substantially like marking the real thing. 
 
3.3. Why this Matters to Designers 
Much  learning  and  training  is  based  on  full-out practice.  Why  is  this  the 
most efficient way to teach everything? If our results generalize, then pro-
cedures and skills, in particular, might be better taught by a process akin to 
marking,  where  we  create little models of things, or use our own bodies to 
pantomime what we must do. This is a highly general idea that can become a 
focus of good design for the learning component of any device. Moreover, as 
an example of an understudied way that humans think, it opens up new ap-
proaches to designing things as different as tools for problem solving, recipes 
for cooking, or resources for smarter collaboration. We return to this shortly. 
 
3.4. Why this Matters more Generally 
The finding that marking is the best method of practicing challenges common 
sense and  previous  work  on  complex  motor  learning.  It  is  common  sense 
that  practicing something the way it should be performed ought to be more 
effective than practicing it with intentional distortions, or with essential com-
ponents missing. If that were not so then repeatedly drawing a face in cari-
cature,  or  perhaps  in  some  other  distorted fashion,  rather  than  drawing  it 
realistically  ought  to  lead  eventually  to  drawing  the face more realistically 
than doing one’s best to draw it correctly each trial. Similarly, practicing ten-
nis stokes without a ball, or by ignoring one’s body position during impact, ought 
to  lead  to better  shots at times  than  always  practicing  in proper form.  Fu-
ture experiments may show that both these marking-like methods are, in fact, AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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better forms of practice than always  practicing  in  an  undistorted,  full  way. 
There are well-known precedents.  In  music  performance,  for  example,  us-
ing exaggeration in rehearsal is thought to be a helpful method of practicing, 
delivering results that surpass repeated full-out play (Hinz 2008). Players often 
practice one aspect of a passage—its fingering, rhythm,  or  bowing,  while  ne-
glecting  intonation  or  tonality  (Stern  and  Patok  2001). Evidently,  marking 
may  already  have  a  valued  place  in  training.
25  But  as  a  general method, 
practicing only distorted versions of the real thing, or versions that leave out 
essential components, is a counterintuitive method of rehearsal. Our unan-
ticipated result is that this counterintuitive method can be effective. 
Our findings also challenge recent work on dance learning. In several exper-
iments  (Cross  et  al.  2009),  found  that  repeated  exposure  to  a  target 
phrase—and  hence “practice” by mental simulation in the motor resonance 
system—leads  to  comparable performance to full-out physical practice. This 
unexpected result was found to hold for  learning  the  rhythm  and  steps  for 
pieces  in  a  game  like  Dance  Dance  Revolution (DDR),  where  subjects  must 
stamp their right or left foot onto footprints on a mat in time with music. Sub-
jects watched the video repeatedly and may have played covertly. In our exper-
iment, the phrases to be mastered were far more complex than DDR, involving 
movement of the entire body, with dynamics and feeling. When confronted 
with  these  more  complex  phrases  we  found  that  dancers  benefited  far 
more from marking and full-out practice than simulation. This suggests that 
moving the body in a controlled manner, even if not close in form to the target 
movement, can facilitate performance. 
If  our  results  about  marking  are  true  then  marking  during  dance  practice 
should not be seen as a sign of fatigue or laziness, as it so often is in dance stu-
dios. Rather, it may be  a  strategic method  for selective  training.  This  opens 
the door to developing more effective methods of selectively working on “as-
pects”  of  a  phrase.  We  speculate  that the  success  of  marking  also  tells  us 
something about how the body itself can be used to help manage attention, 
improve  focus,  and  even  facilitate  simulation  in  a  selective way.  The  body 
may well draw attention to what is important in an activity in the way a hand 
in speed-reading drags the eyes to help reading. 
 
 
 
                                                             
25 Marking  does  not  have  an  acknowledged  value  as  a  form  of  practice  in  dance  despite  its 
universality. Choreographers  and  dancers  recognize  that  they  cannot  always  practice  the  full 
form or a movement. But marking is thought to be a distant second best method. (oral communi-
cation by Wayne McGregor, and other professional dancers) Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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3.5. Conjecture and Method 
When designing the experiment, our conjecture was the following. 
(1)  Practicing a dance phrase full-out would be better than mental simula-
tion, 
(2)  Marking would lie somewhere in the middle: better than mental simu-
lation but worse than full-out. 
Owing to the power of the motor resonance system we wanted to see if any-
thing would be gained by adding body activity to the mental simulation and 
projection we thought occurred during marking anyway. Our belief was that 
dancers  would  learn  something from  marking,  just  not  as  much  as  from 
practicing  full-out.  To  test  this  idea  we  used  the  dancers  from  Random 
Dance, the contemporary company we have been studying (Kirsh et al. 2009). 
All these dancers are superexperts, chosen from an audition pool of 800 pro-
fessional dancers throughout Europe and the States. 
 
3.6. Procedure 
The design required dividing the ten dancers in Random Dance into three 
groups: A, B, All three groups were brought into the studio and taught a new 
dance phrase lasting about 55 seconds. The teaching phase lasted 10 minutes. 
At the end of it, the group left the studio and the dancers returned, one by one, 
to the studio and performed the dance in front of the teacher, who graded 
them to set their baseline. As shown in Figure 2 each group, A, B, C practiced 
in one of three conditions: full-out, marking, and lying on their  back  using 
mental  simulation.  They  were  then  individually  regarded.  After  the  first 
round the dancers swapped practice conditions and were taught a  second 
phrase of about the same duration and complexity as the first. 
Each  dancer’s  performance  was  graded  according  to  established  crite-
ria— technicality, memory, timing, and dynamics—first by the teacher in real 
time and later by two independent expert observers who reviewed the video 
frame by frame. Once all dancers  were  graded,  the  group  returned  to  the 
same large studio and practiced the dance for 10 minutes. When practicing 
they faced in different directions and told not look at each other. Once this 
10-minute practice period was over they left the studio and, as before, re-
turned one by one to be graded by the same criteria as before. See Figure 3. 
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Fig. 2.  Experimental  conditions.  Subjects  practiced mastering  a  phrase  in one of 
three conditions. They marked the phrase, practiced it full out, or lay on their back 
and mentally simulated dancing the phrase. After being evaluated they had a five-
minute rest, changed conditions, and were then taught a new phrase. In this way all 
subjects practiced in each condition. 
 
 
Fig. 3. (a) The temporal structure of the experiment is displayed. After a 10-min. 
teaching phase subjects are evaluated, then they practice, then they are evaluated 
again. Learning is understood as the change in grade acquired during the 10-min. 
practice phase. (b) the experimental design, a 3 by 3 Latin Square, is shown. 
 
3.7. Measures 
Technicality. This means the level of precision found in positions and transi-
tions on a five-point scale, in increments of .5. How structurally correct is the 
position? When a  transition  is  the  object  of  interest,  its  structural  aspect 
can  be  assessed  along  a technicality dimension too. Other elements of accu-
racy, such as the phrase’s dynamic fidelity, are evaluated in the measure on 
dynamics. 
Memory. Memory, or level of detail, refers to the completeness of the movement. 
Does the movement display all the elements at each level in the hierarchy of 
detail? Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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Timing.  This  refers  to  the  level  of  precision  in  the  duration  of  individual 
steps and the duration of transitions. To code timing, coders used frame-by-
frame  measures  for  great  precision  in  comparing  test  conditions  to  their 
normative standard. 
Table II. 
 
Dynamics.  This  refer  to  the  force,  speed,  and  acceleration  of  movements. 
Various qualities  of  motion  such  as  resistance,  juiciness,  roundness,  emo-
tionality, and intentionality are also included in the category of dynamics. 
 
3.8. Results 
Our analysis of results showed the following. 
(1)  Marking  is  the  most  effective  overall  method  of  practicing,  being 
slightly  more learning  efficient  than practicing full-out across  the key 
dimensions of Memory, Technique, and Timing (mean difference = .31; p 
= .0189). In dynamics, however, full-out is better. 
(2)  Both marking and full-out lead to substantially more learning than mental 
simulation across all dimensions (mean difference = 1.19; p = .0001). 
(3)  Mental simulation is not a strong form of practice; there was negligible 
learning and in many cases practice by mental simulation led to a de-
crease in performance. 
Table II shows the mean improvement from practice (the learning delta) as 
measured on a 5-point scale. Improvement was best for marking, less for full-
out and negative for mental simulation. The absolute difference in delta be-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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tween  marking  and  full-out  is 0.31, which is significant when measured by 
the z-score for Technicality, Memory, and Timing (p = .0189). Full is better for 
Dynamics but not significantly so (p = .145). All p values were computed over 
z-scores to reduce noise caused by variability in dancers, measure types and 
graders. 
Table III shows that marking is significantly better than full-out for learning the 
aspects of a phrase related to technicality and memory. Not surprisingly it is less 
effective at learning dynamics, which are rarely practiced in marking. Mental 
simulation was most effective for thinking about technical elements (precision 
in movement). It led to decreased performance, that is, negative learning, for 
movement details. 
To compute these values we first performed one-way ANOVAs on all measures 
in all conditions and found highly significant differences throughout. We then 
ran pairwise post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) and computed p values as 
shown in Table IV. 
 
4. THEORETICAL IDEAS THAT MIGHT EXPLAIN WHY MARKING  
IS SO EFFECTIVE 
What might explain why marking facilitates mental simulation? And what 
might explain why marking is better than full-out practice? The explanation I 
offer highlights a general process that, I believe, applies more broadly than 
just to dancing, to practicing skills  and  to  thinking  with  the body. The  ex-
planatory principle proposed applies also to the process by which we think 
with tools and everyday objects. Marking is merely an activity where it is 
especially easy to notice physical thinking. 
When dancers mark they project beyond what they are actually doing to a 
more ideal movement. We found qualitative support for this idea from in-
terviews with the dancers. When asked what they think about when mark-
ing  they  reported  that  they have  in  mind the full-out  movement, though 
with fewer dynamics. They do not “see” themselves dancing in a distorted 
way, as they would if observing themselves in the studio mirror while mark-
ing, but rather kinesthetically from the inside, feeling the key aspects of the 
movement. They seem to be projecting kinesthetically, and to some degree visu-
ally, from their marking movement to the “correct” or normative movement. 
This correct movement is what they have in their mind’s eye. Marking is just 
the external support or scaffold that helps them have the right mental im-
agery in mind. 
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   Table III. 
 
 
Table IV. P Values Showing the Significance of Findings. 
Measure  Mark  Full>Mar Mark>Si Full>Si
Memory  .7334    <.0001  <.0001 
Technicality  .0029    <.0001  .0005 
Timing  .0194    <.0001  <.0001 
Dynamics  -  .145  .0003  <.0001 
Mem,  Tech, .0189  -  <.0001  <.0001 
 
To explain how an imperfect model of a movement—which is what marking 
literally is—can behave as a  physical  support we  need  to  introduce a few 
ideas. We begin with projection and anchoring. 
Projection is a mental process akin to attaching a mental image to a physical 
structure. When we project onto an object, whether kinesthetically or visually, 
we experience  ourselves  intentionally  augmenting  the  object.  The  object 
anchors  our  mental  image,  and  successful  projection  requires  spatially  or 
temporally locking the projected image onto the anchoring structure. In the 
case of visual projection, the easiest form of projection for sighted people to 
understand, the image to be attached must be the right size and be connect-
ed to a specific location on the external structure. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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When we imagine an object, we again are dealing with mental images but we 
do not attach them to anything in the external world. Imagination has no 
physical anchor, and imagined images need have no specific size or location. 
By contrast, when we perceive an object, we are not imagining or projecting any-
thing. Our experience is of an external object or scene that is supposed to be 
really there.  In veridical  perception  it  is.  Perception  produces  the  highest-
resolution  experience  and varies far less among fully sighted subjects than 
does the vividness of imagination and projection, which varies greatly. 
 
Fig. 4.  The differences between perception, projection, and imagination can be under-
stood as that between seeing the X and O marks on a grid, projecting an image of X and 
O onto a blank grid, and imagining X and O on a blank sheet of paper, or forming a 
mental image of the board and marks while blindfolded. Subjects in the experiment 
described shortly were tested in the projection and imagination conditions only. They 
played by calling out moves using the cell numbering system shown. 
 
As shown in Figure 4, the difference between projection, imagination, and per-
ception can be represented by three conditions in which subjects might play a 
tic-tac-toe game, the domain in which we experimentally explored the idea of 
projection and imagination. 
—Perception.  Subjects  see  the  actual  inscriptions  of  X  and  O  on  a  board. 
Games  are played  in  the  ordinary  way,  by  making  marks.  The  complete 
state  of  the  game  is explicitly represented by the placement of X’s and O’s 
and visually evolves with play. No memory of past moves is required since 
it is on display. 
—Projection. Subjects see only a blank tic-tac-toe grid and have to mentally 
augment the grid with moves. The grid never changes no matter how many 
moves are taken. Everything has to be remembered by the subject, but the 
grid might help structure or support visual recall. Projection is like augment-
ing reality. 
—Imagination. Subjects see a blank page. To play the game they must im-
agine all moves. There is no grid to help support or scaffold their visual recall. Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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They can play the game in this condition either blindfolded or looking at a 
blank piece of paper. Imagination, at its best, is like creating a virtual reality 
game. 
In Kirsh (2009b), the results of running 24 subjects playing tic-tac-toe in the 
projection and imagination conditions were reported. There was no perception 
condition since it  was  assumed  that  if  subjects  recorded  their  moves  they 
would  perform  at  ceiling.  To  play  the  game,  all  subjects  first  learned  to 
name cells using a 1–to–9 numbering system, as shown in Figure 4 for the 
3× 3 board, and a 1–to–16 system for the 4× 4 board. To play the game they 
called out their move after hearing their opponent’s. To test for visual imagi-
nation capacity we administered the standard vividness of visual imagery 
test (VVIQ II) beforehand. 
The  results  were  not  simple.  Subjects  did  not  play  tic-tac-toe  with  better 
speed accuracy  in  any  3×  3  condition.  This  was  not  what  we  predicted. 
Having  a  grid  to anchor projection did nothing in the 3× 3 game where one 
rarely needed to recall more than 5 or 6 moves. 
Table IV. 
 
In 3× 3 games there were no significant differences between conditions. In 4× 4 games 
mean performance was  significantly  better  in  the  grid  condition  than  in  blank 
(mean difference = 1.6s, p = .002). When subjects were binned into weak and strong 
visualizers it was clear that strong visualizers benefited less from a grid to project 
to. Strong visualizers grid > blank = .8s, p = .625; weak visualizers grid > blank = 3.7s, 
p = .014. 
To challenge the subjects, we then taught them to play 4× 4 games. In this 
condition the visual memory load is much greater and we found that hav-
ing a grid appears to facilitate all subjects, but the effect is strongest among 
subjects with lower visualization capacity. As predicted, the grid now appears 
to serve as an understructure or scaffold for projecting moves. The effect was 
divided, though. For weak visualizers the grid strongly enhanced performance. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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By contrast, strong visualizers only trended to perform better with the grid. 
As shown in Table IV, in 4 × 4 games there is an interaction between mental 
imagery ability and the usefulness of the grid. Evidently, if a subject can play 
the  game  well  in  her  imagination  she  gains  little  from  projecting  to  a 
blank  grid. Although our experiment should only be seen as a pilot study 
(n  = 24  overall,  with n = 6 strong visualizers, n = 6 weak visualizers), the 
implication, we believe, is that at some point, when a spatial memory task 
becomes hard enough, everyone benefits from external structure. Hence we 
predict that even good visualizers will benefit from a grid if they play tic-tac-
toe on 5× 5 boards. 
The relevance  of this finding  to marking  is that if  a movement  is  easy to 
learn then marking may not help dancers “visualize” the movement any more 
accurately than mental simulation. Only if a movement is hard to learn would 
we predict that marking facilitates projection by enabling dancers to bring to 
mind movements that are more detailed or precise than they can mentally sim-
ulate while lying down. This is consistent with the findings of Cross et al. (2009) 
and Williams and Gribble (2012). Both found that subjects who simply observed 
other people performing a dance movement were able to learn that movement 
comparably to those practicing the movement fullout themselves. Notably, the 
movements they studied were simple steps forward or sideways, unlike the 
dance phrases we studied, and the movements were learned in response to an 
on screen prompt. This suggests their learning task was easy and the memory 
requirements much weaker than either tic-tac-toe or learning whole dance 
phrases. 
 
4.1. Marking as a Mechanism to Support Projection 
The conjecture we have offered is that marking is a better way for dancers to 
practice than  mental  simulation  because  the  act  of  creating  an  external 
movement  provides a physical anchor for the dancers to project their full 
movement onto. This physical anchor carries some  of the  weight  of imagi-
nation  and  helps  dancers  to  think  more effectively  about  aspects  of  their 
movement that they are trying to improve, recall, or practice. When danc-
ers mark they sketch a movement schematically but have in mind the real 
or  ideal  thing.  They  accomplish  this  feat  either  by  projecting  on  top  of 
marked movements or by using marking as a mediating structure to facili-
tate mental simulation in some as yet unexplained way. 
There  is  little  hard  proof  we  can  provide  that  establishes  that  marking 
supports projection more than by analogy with our tic-tac-toe experiment at 
present. There are some further analogies to be found occurring in natural 
contexts, however, that may show the prevalence of this sort of phenomena. Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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In  music  practice  keeping  the  beat  by  tapping  one’s  foot  is  a  plausible 
analog to using a blank tic-tac-toe board. When musicians tap, arguably, their 
tapping serves as an  anchor  for  projecting  the  musical  rhythm  to  be  per-
formed. Musicians report that when they tap  it is to  provide them  with a 
stable  pulse  to  help  them  stay  on  track while thinking about the musical 
rhythm they must play. Tapping serves as a support structure because it is 
thought to be caused by an internal oscillator (Eck et al. 2000). that  is  suffi-
ciently  automatic  to  liberate  higher  motor  planning  centers  to  work  on 
different, but coordinated, sorts of actions: the rhythmically more complicat-
ed musical rhythms that are played “on top of the beat”. Because the oscil-
lator is autonomous it  behaves  like  an  external  resource,  like  a  tic-tac-toe 
grid, that  can be  leaned  on. For complex rhythms it may help a performer 
to stay in time. Foot tapping may be a dynamic analog in the sound domain 
to visual projection in the visible domain. 
Orchestral  practice  provides  another  example  of  dynamic  projection,  this 
time tied more directly to marking. When a conductor gestures to his en-
semble, carrying  the beat with the dynamics of arm and baton, he is doing 
more than simply embodying or displaying beat. He is marking the piece. His 
arm and gestural dynamics direct each musician to attend to specific musical 
features: crescendo, counterpart, entry moments, etc. These movements cue 
performance.  But they obviously are not the  same full-out thing  that  per-
formers do. The conductor does not play any notes. He does not use a bow 
or  blow  or  strike  drums.  All  the  information  encoded  in  his  gestures  is 
sparse  and  aspectival.  But  by  marking  the  music  he  provides  performers 
something they can work off of. The conductor’s animation anchors projec-
tion;  it anchors performance. Conducting  is  so  natural  and  useful  we  can 
readily believe that players themselves might  run  through  their  own  part 
conductor-like,  stressing  aspects  of  their  music,  using  gesture  and  voice 
rather than through full-out performance on their instrument. A  final  case 
of gesture anchoring projection, this time a purely internal form of projec-
tion, is found in studies of mental abacus. Frank and Barner (2012) studied 
elementary  students  in  Gujarat,  India.  The  students  were  taught  to  add 
and  multiply using an abacus and, once proficient, were then asked to per-
form calculations without using an abacus. The practice is known as men-
tal  abacus  because  the  students  still  use  an  abacus  to  calculate  with, 
though it is an imagined abacus and their manipulations of it are also imag-
ined.  When  students  work  on  their  mental  abacus,  however,  they  almost 
always  flick  their  fingers,  marking-like,  partially  miming  the  action  of 
moving  the beads. When they  are  not permitted  to  use their  hands,  their 
performance suffers (Frank and Barner 2012, Hatano et al. 1977). This sug-
gests  that  gesturing  is not  simply an  epiphenomenon, that  is, an  unneces-
sary accompaniment to the mental operations that do the real work. Hand 
motions  seem  to  improve  mental  simulation. The  mechanism  is  possibly AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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much like marking in dance. By imperfectly simulating moving beads on a 
physical abacus, the students help to create and transform mental structures. 
They project from their own gestures. 
 
4.2. Marking as a Trick for Directing Attention to Aspects of a Movement 
Although our dominant hypothesis about marking is that it supports projec-
tion, it may also perform  a  further  function:  it may  help  subjects  manage 
their attention practice. Marking “keeps the dancers honest”. It helps them 
to focus on aspects
26 of their movement one by one, methodically practicing 
aspects  that  would  otherwise  be  easy  to  overlook  when  simulating  the 
movement mentally. 
For example, we found that in the mental simulation condition dancers were 
especially bad at remembering details, that is, knowing what to do at a de-
tailed level with fingers, head, and feet. Marking might help because if it func-
tions as a type of interactive sketching with  the body, then whenever they 
mark the dancers will have to keep in mind the target body part(s) they are 
sketching. By focusing on specific parts they may avoid ignoring details. 
This  tendency  to  fixate  attention  on  details  of  a  movement  may  also  ex-
plain  why marking  is better than full-out practice.  When dancers  practice 
full-out they execute all aspects of a movement at once. It is not possible to 
work on timing while ignoring the  shape  of  the  movements,  or  work  on 
spatial  extension  while  ignoring  dynamics unless  these  other components 
can be run on auto-pilot while the dancer thinks about a different aspect. 
This is bound to be difficult because there are interactions between aspects 
that make it hard to ignore most aspects when danced at once. When marking, 
by contrast, dancers are allowed to practice piecemeal, working on this part 
or  that, this  aspect  or  that  aspect,  in  a  manner  that  is  guaranteed  to  be 
unaffected  by  other elements precisely because the other elements are not 
being executed at the same time. The idea that performing an external action 
may be a cognitive strategy for helping to manage  attention has  been  dis-
cussed before. In Kirsh (1995), and later in Carlson et al. (2007) experiments 
                                                             
26 A  dancer  may  fixate  on  any  part  or  attribute  of  a  movement.  Laban  movement  analysis 
codifies these aspects into the major categories of body, effort, shape, space. Body – which parts 
are moving, connected or influenced by others, total-body organization; Space – motion in con-
nection with the environment, and with spatial patterns, pathways, and lines of spatial tension; 
Effort – dynamics, qualitative use of energy, texture, color, emotions, inner attitude, often reduced 
to float, thrust, glide, slash, dab, wring, flick, and press; Shape has static forms: pin-like, ball-like, 
wall-like, pyramid-like, screw-like, it has flow forms depicting how the body changes shape during 
movement, and it has shape qualities: rising/sinking, spreading/enclosing, advancing/retreating. 
More macro relations include phrasing and relationships. See Konie, (2011). All these can be ob-
jects of attention, focal points of thought. Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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were discussed in which subjects were asked to count images of items laid out 
on a page. In Kirsh (1995) the items were nickels, dimes and quarters, and the 
task was to provide the total dollar value present; in Carlson et al. (2007) the 
items were asterisks and the task was to count the total number present. 
Both studies found that finger pointing leads to improved performance.  In 
Carlson  et  al.’s  study, it was  observed  further  that head  nodding  occurred 
and  led  to  similar  improvement. One  reason  pointing  is  useful  is  that  it 
might help a subject keep track of what was last counted. Our fingers, un-
like our eyes, stay put unless intentionally moved. Eyes saccade relentlessly. 
Multiple fingers, moreover, can keep track of multiple locations, the last nick-
el,  dime,  and  quarter  counted.  The  relevance  of  such  studies  is  that  they 
remind us that bodies have different properties than minds. They move differ-
ently, they obey a different principle of inertia, and so they are a resource that 
can be harnessed to help solve complex problems. In the case of dance, point-
ing and dance they are useful for helping to manage attention. 
 
5. WHY INTERACTING IS BETTER THAN OBSERVING 
A few years ago it would have seemed unnecessary to ask whether practice is 
necessary for mastery: who would think that watching can substitute for do-
ing? But three theories taken together now make that question worth asking: 
(a) the common coding theory (Prinz 1997), that is, the idea that motor and 
visual perception share a common worldoriented code; (b) motor resonance 
theory (Agnew et al., 2007), that is, the idea that during observation we acti-
vate a motor mirror system where we covertly do what we see; and (c) enac-
tive  perception  (O’Regan  and  Noe  2001),  that  is, the  idea  that we cocreate 
our perceived environments, so perception is itself a form of action. Today the 
question is: When is observing as good as doing? Is it possible that a couch pota-
to might learn as much about an activity by simply watching it on TV as doing 
it himself? 
It is important for designers to know whether first-hand motor involvement 
matters as much as common sense claims. If, for instance, it turns out that 
we  can  learn  to cook as well by watching the cooking channel as by real 
practice in the kitchen then designers  thinking  of  interactive  kitchens  of 
the  future  will  want  to  use  video  for teaching and direction rather than 
have instructions emanate directly from tools and surfaces. Alternatively, if 
working with imperfect models of things is often a better way to learn com-
plex activity than is regular practice, and hence better than observation too, 
then it follows that embedding recipes in tangible things, providing cues for 
slicing in knives, hints in spatulas, will be the design of choice, because then 
tools will focus attention on aspects of a recipe in a timely way. It may even 
be worthwhile to embody recipes  in  toy  models  of  pots,  pans,  and  egg-
plants  for  a  quick  run  through  before  full-out cooking. What applies  to AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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kitchens  applies  to  hundreds  of  environments  where  pervasive,  context-
aware computation will become the norm. 
The main phenomena that we observed that calls into question the thesis that 
“observing is as good as acting” relates to the obvious idea that each of our sens-
es picks up different information. Even if there is a common code and motor 
resonance is correct, it does not follow that visual perception drives as much 
covert motor activity as actual movement coupled with kinesthetic perception. 
Motor planning may be more responsive  to  kinesthetic  factors.  Vision  pro-
vides only a fraction of the information needed to adapt interactively to rap-
idly changing forces in our environment or bodies. These need to be picked up 
kinesthetically. 
To explore this question empirically we studied videos of how our choreog-
rapher works  with  dancers  when  creating  new  movements.  One  of  his  fa-
vorite methods is to watch as they solve a choreographic problem and then, 
when  he  sees  something interesting, he physically sketches their movement 
himself. He doesn’t just watch, he imitates. Then he modifies his sketch a few 
times and gives them back his own version. They engage in a physical dialog. 
But not always. It is quite clear the choreographer can make his ideas known 
using  words,  gestures,  or  sounds,  rather  than  displays.  So,  presumably,  on 
those occasions when he imitates movement it is because it gives him insight 
in a way that vision alone does not. See Kirsh (2012b), where this process of 
“riffing-off-of-others” is discussed. 
Intuitively, it is clear why the choreographer physically appropriates a danc-
er’s action. By performing the movement he can better appreciate the creative 
possibilities of  a  movement.  The  continuation  structure  he  develops  about 
how the movement might be carried forward—about where it might go crea-
tively—is different when he is the author than when he is the observer. And 
for good reason. 
In  dance, some phenomenological attributes  emerge only when  the body  is 
genuinely  involved.  Consider  the  experience  of  internal  force,  resistance, 
stretching-to-thepoint-where-it-hurts,  or  rotating-so-quickly-you-are-just-
about-to-lose-control. These are phenomenologically prominent features that 
arise  when  we  interact  with  objects or work with our bodies. But they are 
mostly invisible visually. We feel more than we show. And when as observers 
we see something subtle we may be misled. For one thing, people are different 
in their strength, flexibility, and pain thresholds. An easy stretch or lift for a 
dancer  may  be  painful  for  me.  So  when  I  see  what  looks  like  a  painful 
stretch, my sympathetic feeling, that is, my mirror pain, may be unreliable. 
Moreover, some body feelings are completely invisible. The feeling a person has 
just before falling or losing balance, for instance, or the amount of resistance Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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being  imposed  on  an arm motion
27, all these are prominent kinesthetically 
but invisible behaviorally. 
This  difference  in  the  sensory  representation  between  watching  and  danc-
ing  is,  I  believe,  one  of  the  primary  reasons  the  choreographer  runs  the 
movements of others through his own body. There is only so much he can know 
about a movement by looking, even with his motor resonance system running 
all out, and with his overdeveloped expert vision. This limitation is common-
place. For instance, when a potter works on the wheel, shaping a bowl, there 
are sensory attributes that can be felt by the hands that cannot be seen, such 
as the feeling when the clay is about to tear, or the feel of the texture of the 
clay. The potter may feel the “continuation space” of this pot, that is, the enac-
tive  landscape,  more  effectively  and  be  better  positioned  to  know  whether 
s(he) can recover from an about-to-tear situation. The hands know things the 
eyes do not (Malafouris 2008; O’Connor 2006). 
At  a  more  fundamental  level  each  sensory  system  supports  different  path-
ways of sensory expectation. Events that seem “natural” or obvious in one sen-
sory  system  may  seem  unnatural  or  completely  unobvious  in  another. 
Things  that  are  predictable  in one  sense, such as,  “if  I move  my  arm  any 
further it will hurt” are not predictable in another. Some things are easy to 
infer, others are not. Different senses make different attributes explicit, obvi-
ous, such as “I am in pain”. 
This is a universal property of representational systems: some properties are 
encoded explicitly; others are more implicit and must be computationally ex-
tracted. For  instance, to decide whether the number 30,163 is divisible-by-7 
takes some computation. The attribute divisible-by-7 is not as explicit in the base 
10 as divisible-by-10 or being odd. We can instantly tell that 30,163 is not di-
visible-by-10, and that it is odd. In the base 7, however, 30,163 is represented as 
153,6407, and it is completely obvious that it is divisible-by-7. It is transparent 
and explicit. It is less explicit that it is odd. See Kirsh 1992, 2009d) for an  analysis of 
explicit-implicit  representation. Each sensory system has a coding language that 
represents some attributes explicitly and downplays others. 
Returning to dance, a dancer may immediately recognize through his somato-
sensory system what level of control is needed to execute a particularly complex 
move. Visually this may be unclear.  In  extreme  cases, a  movement  that  the 
motor  system  deems impossible may not seem impossible according to the 
visual  system.  The  upshot  is  that  when  a  choreographer  considers  how  a 
movement might be continued, his conception derived from vision may be dif-
ferent than his conception derived from riffing. By riffing the  movement,  he 
                                                             
27 Resistance is a technical term in dance to refer to the antagonism of muscles when they pull in 
opposite directions. Isometric exercises are extreme cases of muscle antagonism. AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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physically  appropriates  it,  thereby  activating  a  system  of  motor intuitions 
that are different than his vision-based motor intuitions. 
One especially clear example of this is found in Wayne McGregor’s own oeuvre. In 
the piece Ataxia, McGregor explored some of the movement space of ataxics, 
people who have imperfect motor feedback. The kinesthetic phenomenology of 
ataxics is unlike that of normal subjects. Dancers and McGregor himself worked 
with ataxics to get a sense of what it is like to have ataxia. This was not done by 
watching them alone. It was vital that  they  learned  to  move  like  ataxics,  a 
process that took some time. By simulating an ataxic’s body motion, however, 
both  dancer  and  choreographer  gained  access  to  a different  aesthetic.  The 
narrative  of  the  dance,that  is,  the  movement  vocabulary  the  dance  was 
based  on,  was  derived  from  familiarity  with  the  kinesthetics  of  ataxia. 
Again, watching was not enough. Indeed, it is quite possible that much of the 
dance was “written” more in motor feelings than visual form. Body sense of-
fered a different basis for aesthetics. 
One consequence of our research on dance, then, is that bodies are involved in 
cognition in more ways than motor resonance and common coding. Riffing, in 
particular, shows that working across modalities can reshape the conceptual-
ization of something (e.g., a dance phrase) beyond its origins in one modality, 
the seen modality. It shows how the body can figure in extending the range of 
thought; how our bodies can lead us to new ideas that are far from the senso-
ry-specific ways we encountered these ideas originally. 
This echoes a widely appreciated feature of human thought, namely, that when 
people interact with external artifacts—representations, instruments, toys—
they  are  able to  learn  new  things,  or  understand  things  more  deeply.  The 
physical act of sketching a familiar object can help us realize aspects of it that 
we  never  noticed  or  thought  of  before.  Playing  with  a  physical  model  of 
something first seen in the movies (a transformer toy, for example) can open 
our minds to some of its deeper properties. It is still the same object, and we 
still have the same basic concept of it, but we know more about it, or see it in a 
new way. Engaging with it physically helped us learn far more about it than 
just seeing someone else play with it. Making and working with models is good 
for advancing cognition. 
 
6. EXTENDING EMBODIED COGNITION TO INCLUDE THINKING  
WITH THINGS 
In earlier sections I discussed how tools can be absorbed into the body, how 
bodies can be used to model and simulate, and how running ideas through 
the body  that  were first encountered visually can lead to perceiving crea-
tive possibilities that otherwise were hidden from sight and mirror cognition. 
The next step is to show how things other than the body and tools can be har-Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
 
158 
 
nessed and incorporated into the thinking process. It is to this I now turn. 
The burden of this section is to expand on the idea of thinking with things 
beyond its usual interpretation as computational off-loading, a topic that I 
believe has been well covered in discussions of situated cognition (Clark 1997; 
Kirsh 2009a) and external cognition (Clark 2008; Scaife and Rogers 1996). 
My basic line is that thinking, in the sense of drawing inferences, can be done 
partly in the perceptuo-motor system and partly by manipulating external 
things in a manner that is tightly coordinated with inner processes. Manip-
ulating external things, even when we do not appreciate it, is a form of simu-
lation. When we interact with an object our interaction drives our perceptuo-
motor system into a state of expectation, and we tacitly assign probabilities 
to outcomes conditional on what we might do ourselves. Thus, in the sim-
plest case, if a subject were to start to upend an object, his action may begin 
to unocclude part of it, and he may infer something about the object’s bot-
tom, or  its  overall  shape,  as  well  as  anticipate  its  appearance  just  before 
actually seeing the bottom. Few theorists would call this form of expectation 
and pattern completion a form of reasoning. But formally extrapolation is a 
type of inductive inference, and completion is a form of extrapolation or in-
terpolation. 
Suppose now that our subject were to do something manipulatively more inter-
esting. He might, for example, hit the object on the edge of a counter or pour 
water into it. These actions were improbable a moment before, and the percep-
tual input they produce will have a major impact on the shape of the continua-
tion tree, that is, on the lattice of possibilities representing what the subject 
expects could happen. Because of the nature of some actions, these expecta-
tions may have more to do with the causal mechanics of the object than its 
shape. An example of causal mechanics might be the effects of twisting a bot-
tle cap. On the account I am recommending a subject who begins to twist a 
cap starts to simulate not just cap twisting but a twisting-off process. As he 
proceeds in twisting, his perceptuo-motor  system predicts future outcomes, 
many of which represent a world where the cap falls completely off the bottle. 
My hypothesis here is that when people think with things they rely on the 
world to  simulate  itself  and  in  so  doing  they  stimulate  themselves.  They 
indirectly control their epistemic state. The world executes part of the rea-
soning process, therefore, by carrying them to a new state that is reasoning 
relevant.  Thus,  as  the  thing  they  manipulate undergoes change, people re-
vise their continuation system (and their enactive landscapes). This revision 
to their continuation space is equivalent to a change in their enactive percep-
tion of what is happening. But mathematically, it is identical to a form of in-
duction, that is, of learning and reasoning. The result is that if we were to ask 
our cap twister whether he thinks that if he continues twisting he will re-AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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move the cap, his answer (yes) looks like it is the product of thought. And it is. 
But it is not propositional thought in a classical sense. 
On a classical account (Harman 1986) every use of the cap is an experiment, a 
piece of data to be assimilated through induction, deduction, or abduction. 
A person has an internal hypothesis concerning how the world is and the 
effect that twisting will have on the cap. He tests the hypothesis by experi-
menting  with  the  cap.  Beliefs  are revised  and  new  opinions  come  to  the 
fore. This whole process makes no reference to changes in perception, con-
ception, or skill. Perception serves as a pass-through of the world state. The 
result is that a propositional representation of the world suffices, and rea-
soning becomes the same old classical idea of rules operating on propositional 
representations
28,  something  not  far  from  the  language  of  thought  (Fodor 
1975). 
By contrast, when our thinking subject infers something he will often be report-
ing an expectation encoded in his continuation system. A lattice of continua-
tions is not a propositional representation. Inner simulations of scenarios can 
reshape this continuation system. On those occasions where he cannot simulate 
the future well internally, or if there is too much uncertainty in how he thinks 
things will unfold, he can reach out and begin twisting the cap, that is, perform 
an outer simulation. Unlike Harman (1986), this is not equivalent to performing 
an experiment. It is to cause a revision in his continuation set. The new input 
alters the enactive landscape he cocreates. 
The bottom line is that physical thinking is an external version of the idea in 
embodied cognition that much of our cognitive life depends on internal simu-
lation of things. In  the  embodied  literature,  simulation  is  internal.  I  have 
argued here and elsewhere that we can expand this notion. If internal simu-
lation counts as thinking why not also count external simulation as thinking 
(Kirsh 2010).  And if that seems too extreme then at least we should allow 
the  coordination  of  internal  and  external  processes  to  be  thinking.  It  is 
simply a matter of cost whether to simulate inside with images and ideas or 
to simulate outside with real things, but in a controlled manner. 
I believe that developing this view—that literally we think with things—will 
have major implications for how designers come to understand interactive 
objects and systems. 
 
 
 
                                                             
28 However, see Johnson-Laird (1989) for a model-based approach to propositional reasoning that 
relies on structural elements that need not themselves be components of a proposition. Embodied Cognition and the Magical Future of Interaction Design 
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7. CONCLUSION 
HCI is at a crossroads. We are entering a new world of physical, natural, and 
tangible interfaces. We can interact with digital elements by gesturing and 
body movement, by manipulating everyday objects, and even by training brain 
activity to control interfaces. To understand the design principles of such a 
world requires that we become familiar with the ongoing developments in 
embodied, distributed, and situated cognition, and build closer relations to 
their research agenda. 
In this article, we explored the idea of tool absorption and how our internal 
representation of personal and peripersonal space adapts to manipulables in 
our  hands  and  wearables on our feet and body. There are open questions 
about how far we can extend our action repertoire through tele-presence and 
remote actuation, and how far we can push our perception beyond its nor-
mal semantics. Is it possible to control actuators that have dozens  of  sepa-
rately articulable fingers in a wholly natural way, that is, absorb them into 
our  body  system?  What  is  the  mapping  function  between  our  own action 
repertoire and “tool” created  repertoires?  I  introduced  the notion of  enac-
tive landscapes to define the cocreated actionable environment that we per-
ceive, Gibsonian style, in terms of what we can do. But unlike Gibson we includ-
ed tool-supported actions as part of our action repertoire and hence ways we 
can alter our enactive landscape. To an agent, the world is a constellation of 
intersecting,  overlapping  enactive  landscapes,  engendered  by  the  tools  in 
hand and the resources nearby. When a tool is picked up or let go there is a 
change in capability that leads to a change in the enactive landscapes that 
are  active.  Because  tools  alter  our  action  repertoire,  they  shape  both  our 
perception and conception of what is present to be acted on. With further de-
velopment  this  idea  may  have  useful  application  in  understanding  how 
digital interactivity will reshape our sense of what we can do. 
I think it is fair to say that the view that tools modify our perception, concep-
tion, and even our bodies is one that the HCI community has accepted in one 
form or another for some time, though without adequate empirical and theo-
retical support. This support is  starting  to  arrive.  We  also  need theory  and 
empirical  support  for  a  more  modern conception  of  our  bodies  and  what 
they are capable of doing. A consequence of our research  on  dance  is  that 
we  have  evidence  that  human bodies can be  used  for all sorts of cognitive 
purposes. In particular, humans use their bodies not just to act on the world 
and enact or cocreate a personal world, they use them to represent, model, 
and  ultimately  self-teach.  They  use  their  bodies  as  simulation  systems,  as 
modeling systems  that  make  it  possible  to  project  to  unseen  things  that 
would  otherwise  be more  inaccessible.  These  unseen  things  may  be  dance 
phrases that are the target of learning, or they may be aspects of those phrases 
that need to be attended to in order to master the phrase. Dancers also use their AVANT  Volume IV, Number 2/2013 www.avant.edu.pl/en 
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bodies to perform analog computation, since they can rely on the mechanical 
properties of their bodies to complete trajectories that otherwise would need to 
be planned and computed. 
We learned further that dancers make good use of their different senses. For 
instance,  kinesthetic  perception  reveals  different  properties  than  visual 
perception, and these kinesthetic properties, because of the way they are en-
coded, make it easier to recognize the validity of inferences that would be 
near impossible to infer from vision alone, if one did not also move the body. 
For our choreographer, for example, we found that by recruiting  his kines-
thetic sense he is able to “see” aesthetic properties and narrative properties 
of dance phrases that are unavailable through the visual spectrum. He uses 
vision to observe his dancers’ work on phrases, but he runs these phrases 
through his own body to appropriate them and appreciate their choreograph-
ic possibilities. 
Given  the  power  of  tools  and  bodies  to  extend  thought  it  is  natural  to 
make  the final step to other objects as things that people can use to think 
with. The hypothesis presented here is that much of human thinking takes 
place  in the  perceptuo-motor system or an extension of it. We interact with 
the world and in so doing we physically simulate outcomes, or begin to simu-
late processes that shape our internal expectations of how things may turn 
out. This revision of perceptuo-motor expectations is not done propositionally 
or consciously. It is a form of implicit cognition and buried deeply in our 
perceptual system. But it results in changes in how we mentally simulate 
the future. Thus, if someone were to ask us whether sitting on a chair dis-
tributes pressure over  the  chair’s  legs,  a  thoughtful  person  might  run  a 
mental  simulation  of  sitting down or a mental simulation of reaching un-
der a  leg and  feeling the  weight of the chair. Alternatively, he might begin 
the  reasoning  process  by  actually  sitting  down  and  using  the  resulting 
changes in his continuation system to make mental simulation intuitive. 
Once we understand the complex coordination between external and inter-
nal simulation, between doing things internally and doing things externally, 
we will begin to reach new heights in design, and create a cognitively better 
world of physical-digital coordination. 
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